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                        Abstract 
     Norm formation is one of the most basic processes of social interaction. To clarify 
this process, we introduce mutual commitment and meta commitment among agents. R. 
Axelrod has analyzed the commitment structure of norm formation and the collapsing 
process of the norm as his norm and meta norm games [1] . He analyzes the games with 
genetic algorithm. 
     In this paper we generalize the games as mutual commitment processes of agents [6] . 
We also introduce the commitment by central authorities uch as a government that enforces 
legal policies. We deal with the model from theoretical point of view. For the purpose of 
describing a social learning dynamics, we introduce replicator dynamics (RD). RD is usually 
used in evolutionary game theory. We induce RD from stochastic learning process. 
     At first we reformulate the norm game as a coupling model between the replicator 
dynamics of alternatives {C,D} and the dynamics of normative attitude. We also extend this 
model and introduce several types of centralized and decentralized commitment mechanisms 
on agent societies. 
                     Key Words 
Norm Game, Multi Agent System, Replicator Dynamics, Indirect Control, Indirect 
Regulation, Poly Agent System 
1. Introduction 
     In this paper we focus on the concept of norm as a decentralized indirect regulation 
on a society. For this purpose, we analyze the mutual commitment and the meta commitment 
processes among agents as shown in figure 1. 
     The concept of norm is analyzed in multidisciplinary area of social science. It is 
difficult to give it a suitable definition but R. Axelrod has introduced the essential definition 
of it [1]. He defines norm and meta norm games and introduces mutual and hierarchical 
commitment structures on these games. He explains how norms are collapsed and maintained 
on the games. 
     We reformulate his norm and meta norm games using extended replicator dynamics 
for social learning. Replicator dynamics (RD) is usually derived from random matching no 
cooperative game that represents evolutionary process [3]. In this paper we extend RD and 
use it to describe social learning process. 
      Axelrod introduces his norm game as an extension of n-person Prisoner's Dilemma. 
He adds a new feature of normative attitude to the dilemma game, which is to punish 
defectors under the mutual monitoring and commitment processes. 
      In the norm game, the strategies of players consist of two dimensions. He introduces 
two set of alternatives, {Boldness, No- Boldness } and {Vengefulness, No-Vengefulness }. 
The former one represents if a player is enough bold to defect or not. In other words, it is an 
attitude to follow, or not to follow, the norm. The later one represents if a player is enough 
vengeful to punish the player who does not follow the norm. It is an indirect regulation of the 
norm through mutual commitment to other person's attitude. 
     He analyzes the norm game with genetic algorithm and shows how norms collapse 








Figure 1 Norm Game Dynamics: Norm Collapsing Process 
(Axcelrod The complexity of Cooperation Ch-3 ) 
     He also shows how to prevent he retrogression of normative commitment and how to 
maintain the norm. He introduces the concept of meta norm as mutual meta commitment for 
normative commitment. It means that a player is enough meta vengeful to punish the. player 
who does not execute his normative commitment. If the meta norm mechanism is 








Figure 2 Meta Norm Game Dynamics: Norm Maintained 
(Axcelrod The complexity of Cooperation Ch.3) 
     We reformulate his norm game and meta norm game with extended replicator 
dynamics of social learning. For this purpose, we introduce the concept of decentralized 
indirect regulation or indirect control of agent society. We also introduce the social learning 
interpretation of RD, which is called social learning dynamics.
2. Social Learning Dynamics 
     RD is usually derived from random matching no cooperative game that represents
3
evolutionary process. This is what we call evolutionary interpretation of RD. In the context 
of social science, the evolutionary interpretation is not satisfied in many cases. Instead, we 
introduce the replicator dynamics under the social learning interpretation. The interpreted 
dynamics is called social learning dynamics. For this purpose we introduce the following 
Markov process on the alternatives { C, D}. In here "C" means "No- Boldness" and "D" 
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Then we can introduce the dynamics of decision probability as follows. It is also interpreted 
to the population ratio of the choice of alternatives. 
Proof: 
Pc(t+h)=Pc(t) *Pcc [h] (t)+Pd(t) *Pdc [h] (t) 
=Pc(t)+h*Pc(t)*Pd(t){Ec(t)-Ed(t)}/W(t) 
A [Pc[h](t)=Pc(t+h)-Pc(t)=h*Pc(t)*Pd(t){Ec(t)-Ed(t)}/W(t) 
dPc(t)/dt=lim A Pc[h](t)/h= Pc(t)*Pd(t){Ec(t)-Ed(t)}/W(t) 
                h->O 
    = Pc(t){ Ec(t)-W(t)}/W(t) Q.E.D. 
     In the model a player changes his attitude slowly by himself under the influence of 
average payoff of alternatives. In other words we derive the dynamics not from direct 
interaction among agents and its payoff, but from average payoff of alternatives. Average 
payoff might be obtained by the random matching ame in some cases or obtained from 
other social interactions as we mention in the following section, where we pay attention to 
the commitment processes among agents. 
3. Social Learning Dynamics of Norm Game 
3.1 Norm Game 
     In the norm game, if a player dose defect then he gets payoff of T=3. Pd and Pc 
denote the normalized population ratio of the selection of Boldness and No-Boldness 
respectively. Pc=1-Pd holds from definition. In this paper we used "C" for "NO-Boldness" 
and "D" for "Boldness" respectively. PV and Pnv denote the normalized population ratio of 
the selection of Vengefulness and No-Vengefulness respectively. Pnv=1- PV also holds. 
     As pointed earlier, "Vengefulness" represents the normative attitude under the mutual 















Figure 4 Mutual Reference and Commitment 
     For formulating replicator dynamics of the norm game we introduce average payoff 
structure as follows according to Axelrod's game structure. 











Then we can introduce RD for norm game as follows. 
Where-we assume a<d<b<c. Let a=1, b=3, c=9, d=2 in the following simulation. 
dPc/dt = Pc*(1-Pc)*(EC-ED) (3.1.1) 
dPV/dt = PV*(1-PV)*(EV-Env) (3.1.2) 
EC = -a*(1-Pc) 
ED = b*Pc - c*PV 
Env = 0 
EV = -d*(1-Pc) 
pd=1-Pc 
Pnv = 1-PV 
Proposition 3.1 
Pc=1 is a stable steady state of (3.1.1) if and only if PV>{(b-a)Pc + a}/c 
Proof: 
Pc=1 is a steady state of (3.1.1). The stability depends on the sign of EC-ED. 
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dPc/dbO EC-ED>O -a*(1-Pc)>b*Pc - c*PV PV>{(b-a)Pc+a}/c Q.E.D. 
We add the perturbation factor to this model. The result shows the collapsing process of the 
norm and it corresponds to the Axelrod's simulation by using genetic algorithm (GA) under 
the Complex Adaptive System (CAS) paradigm. 
Proposition 3.2 
(1) Let PV>{(b-a)Pc+a}/c. Then IdPV/dtl <_ d* E /4, where E =1-Pc is small perturbation. 
(2) Let PV<{(b-a)Pc+a}/c. Then IdPV/dtl <_ d* a /4, where a =1-Pc become 1 as a result. 
Proof: 
(1) PV>{(b-a)Pc+a}/c means dPc/db0 from proposition 3.1. Then Pc become 1 with small 
perturbation E. O.-PV) <_ 1/4, EV = -d*(1-Pc)=-d E and Env = 0 hold. Then 
IdPV/dtI =1 PV*(1-PV)*(EV-Env)1 <_d*E/4. 
(2) PV<{(b-a)Pc+a}/c means dPc/dt<0 from proposition 3.1. Then Pc become 0. 
Then IdPV/dtI =1 PV*(l-PV)*(EV-Env)I<_d*a/4 Q.E.D. 
The proposition 3.2 (1) asserts that the decreasing rate of PV is small and in proportion to e. 
The proposition 3.2 (2) asserts that the decreasing rate of PV becomes large in proportion to 
a.
I
Next we show the role of small group as the salt of the earth who prevent he collapse of 
norm by increasing the average payoff when PV>{(b-a)Pc+a}/c holds. 
Proposition 3.3 
Let EV =-d* E +A. Then the collapse of norm is prevented if A >d* E hold. 
Proof: 
EV = -d*(1-Pc)+ A =-d E +A and Env = 0 hold. 
Then EV-Env >0 -d E +A >0 A >d E hold. Q.E.D. 
The proposition 3.3 asserts that the decreasing rate of PV is prevented by small compensation 
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Figure 5 Norm Collapse Figure 6 Bifurcation of Pc Dynamics 
     The norm game provides a new conceptual model of the norm. The GA simulation 
provides experimental discovery such as collapsing process of the norm. GA is a complex 
and complicated algorithm. It is difficult to extract systemic properties from the simulation. 
     It is also difficult to extend the model to more general centralized and decentralized 
regulation processes of an agent society under the mutual commitments. 
     We reformulate the mechanism with the population dynamics called RD. Once we 
give the mathematical formulation, it is easy to analyze and extend the mechanism. 
     The model consists of two 1 dimensional RD and its weak coupling. Population ratio 
of Vengefulness (V) becomes a bifurcation parameter for the dynamics of underlying 
alternatives {C,D}. If PV is large enough then Pc increases. If V becomes small then the 
system bifurcates and Pd increases. The bifurcation structure is shown in the figure 6. 
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3.2 Meta Norm 
     Axelrod also introduced the concept of meta norm that is included in the concept of 
meta commitment among agents. It is illustrated in figure 7. In this figure, the thick arrows 










Figure 7. Commitment and Meta Commitment 
We introduce the average payoff table of -commitment and meta commitment of alternatives 
as follows.











Then we can introduce RD for meta norm game as follows. 
Where we assume a<d<b<c=e. Let a=1, b=3, c=9, d=2, e=9 in the following simulation. We 
also introduce fluctuation in the simulation.
dPc/dt = Pc * (1-Pc) * (EC-ED) 
dPV/dt = PV*(1-PV)*(EV-Env) 
dPMV/dt = PMV*(1-PMV)*(EMV-EMnv) 
EC = -a*(1-Pc), ED = b*Pc - c*PV 
EMnv = 0, EMV = -d*(1-PV) 
Env = -e*PMV, EV = -d*(1-Pc) 
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Figure 8 RD for Meta Norm 
     We have the same question that meta norm also collapse or not. The following 
proposition answer the question. 
Proposition 3.4 
     Let E and E' be positive perturbation around Pc=1 and positive perturbation around 
PMV=O respectively. If E and E' are same scale of positive perturbation and c>d then PV=1 
is stable. 
Proof: 
     We show that dPV /dt>0. dPV/dt = PV * (1-PV) * (EV -Env). 
Then dPV/dt>O4--*EV>Env<=*-d*(1-Pc)>-c*PMV holds. From the assumptions 
-d*(1-Pc)>-c*PMV -d c > -c* E' holds and E and E' are same scale of perturbation. 
Thus we can assume that E =E' . Then c>d is the condition for dPV/dt>0. Q.E.D. 
     In the previous example c=9, d=2 satisfy the condition. 
4. Centralized Commitment and Support 
4.1 Type of Commitments 
     Once we formulate the mathematical model of the norm and analyze its bifurcation 
mechanism, we can extend the model to more general processes of mutual reference and 
commitments. We add centralized commitment structure in the society. We also introduce 
the positive sanction mechanism as comment process such as supporting attitude. 
     In the previous chapters we have analyzed the mutual reference and commitment 
processes. We call the mechanism as decentralized commitment, which effects as indirect 
regulation of agent societies. The norm and meta norm effect on the underlying alternatives 
as a decentralized indirect regulation. Now we try to design another indirect regulation 
mechanism of agent societies.
Government
 Monitoring 
& Sanction by 
Government.
Figure 9 Centralized Monitoring and Sanction for Underlying Actions
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Figure 10 Centralized Monitoring and Sanction for Mutual Commitments 
      In this section we assume that there is an central authority such as government in the 
society and introduce centralized commitment processes. For example monitoring and a fine 
for a parking violation is a typical centralized commitment for underlying actions, which is 
shown in figure 9. We also pay attention to the centralized commitment for mutual 
commitment processes and meta commitment processes, which is shown in figure 10. 
     We also introduce positive sanction as a commitment to the model. In the norm and 
meta norm games, the sanction is negative penalty. Instead, we can use positive sanction 
such as supporting commitment instead of negative one. 
4.2 Educational Effect and Supporting Commitment 
     To clarify our new concepts, we construct he model of educational effect and its 
support by government as follows. We introduce the underlying alternatives "A" and "B" . In 
this case we assume that "ASup" and "BSup" are alternatives that mean supporting the 
underlying alternatives respectively. Alternatives "AKnow" and "Bknow" mean the belief 
that "A" is correct and "B" is correct respectively. 
      In the model we assume that "A" is a desirable attitude in the long run for the society 
and "B" is conventional attitude. We assume the dilemma situation shown in the table 3. We 
also assume that there is a political support for the "Aknow". 
     The initial conditions for the simulation assume that old belief such as "PbKnow" and 
"PBSup" are dominant. But the educational support changes the situation drastically. As the 
right knowledge spread, agents who support right manner increase. Then population of "A" 
spreads. 
When we consider basic interaction layer, we get the following interaction table of payoff. 
     Table 3 Payoff of Interaction 
         A B
     A (a, a) (-b, 0) 
      B (0, -b) (-a, -a) 
Furthermore, we consider the following positive sanction as commitment shown by "ASup" 
and "BSup". We also assume meta commitment from correct knowledge shown by 
"AKnow" and "BKnow".









E[A] -b*Pb a*Pa c*PASup
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E[B] 0 -a*Pb 0
E[ASup] 0 d*Pa e *PaKnow
E[BSup] 0 d*Pb 0
E[AKnow] 0 0 pol supA=1
E[BKnow] 0 0 0
Where "a", "b", "d", and "e" mean basic payoff of interaction, negative sanction from 
conservatives, bandwagon effects, and positive support by correct knowledge respectively. 
At the first stage we are bound by convention. How can we do away with conventionalities? 
We are too conventional at the first stage because of the sanction from conservatives and 
bandwagon effects. 
We assume a<b. Let a=2, b=5, c=3, d=1, and e=2 in the following simulation. 
Then we can introduce RD for meta commitment game as follows. We also introduce 
fluctuation in the simulation. 
dPa/dt = Pa*(1-Pa)*(EA-EB) 
dPaKnow/dt = PaKnow*(1-PaKnow)*(EAKnow-EBKnow) 
dPASup/dt = PASup*(1-PASup)*(EASup-EBSup) 
EA = -b(1-Pa)+aPa+c*PASup, EB = 0*Pa-a(1-Pa)+0*(1-PASup) 
EASup = Pa+e*PaKnow, EBSup = (1-Pa)+0*(1-PaKnow) 
EAKnow = polsupA, EBKnow = 0, polsupA = 1 
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Figure 12 The spread of right attitude 
Proposition 4.1 
Let PASup=O. This means that there is no supportive commitment for attitude "A" . 
(1) If a<b then Pb=1 is stable, i.e., an existing conventional attitude is not overthrown. 
(2) If a>0 then Pa=1 is stable, i.e., an existing desirable attitude is maintained. 
Proof: 
(1) We show that dPa/dt<O EA-EB<O -b*(1-Pa)+a*Pa+c*PASup+a*(1-Pa)<0 
  a-b +c*PASup+b*Pa<O 
  a+c*PASup<b-b*Pa 
If PASup=O , Pb=1, and a<b then dPa/dt<O holds. 
(2) dPa/dt>O C-* a+c*PASup>b-b*Pa. 
Let Pa=1 and a>0 then dPa/dt>O holds even if PASup=O. Q.E.D. 
We are interested in a overthrowing process of existing conventional attitude. 
The proof shows that if PASup is enough large and a+c*PASup>b then dPa/db0 holds for 
any Pa>O. 
Proposition 4.2 
Let PaKnow=1 then e>d is the condition of spreading supportive commitment of attitude "A" 
for any Pa. 
Proof: 
We show that dPASup/dt>O. 
dPASup/dt=PASup(1-PASup)(EASup-EBSup) 
dPASup/dt>0 EASup-EBSup>Ot= e*PaKnow+d*Pa-d*(1-Pa)>O 
   e*PaKnow+d*Pa-d+d*Pa>0,(--> e*PaKnow>d-2d*Pa 
We assume that PaKnow=1 then e*PaKnow>d-2d*Pa e>d-2d*Pa. 
Then e>d is the condition of dPASup/db0 for any Pa. 
     We can show the typical interpretation of this model. A great deal of effort has been 
put into the project of birth control by the United Nations, but the centralized irect sanction 
policy has been failed. People do not want to change their belief. Now they say that the 
spread of right knowledge and its support for birth control are only the way. 
5. Historical Change of Social Commitment Structure 
      Once we recognize hierarchical mutual commitment among agents, we can easily 
explain norm formation and other social order and its change. Furthermore, we can 
characterize historical change of the commitment structure in our society. In pre-modern 
society, decentralized commitment such as meta norm is a typical way of mutual 
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Figure 13 Indirect Control on Pre-Modern Society 1 












Figure 14 Indirect Control on Pre-Modern Society 2 
     In pre-modern society, it is difficult to manage the change of social order quickly. 
Modem society is highly fluid and varied. Modem society requires dynamic change for its 
economical development. In the society, new way of the formation of social norm is 
required. Under the nation state, the old way of mutual sanction became out-of-date. Two 
types of the way of commitments introduced by the nation state. One is the rule of law and 
another is education by mass media and school. 
     If someone breaks the law then he would be judged and punished by law under the 
social monitoring, which is shown in the following figure.
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Figure 15 Monitoring and Punishment by Law 
     Another way of social commitment is developed in modern society. It consists of 
positive commitment such as support for underlying attitude, meta commitment depending 
on knowledge & information and educational support of knowledge. In modern society 
knowledge formation are supported or affected by education or mass media . The process is 
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Figure 16 Meta Commitment by Knowledge & Information and Its Support 
     Of course this classification is a representative one in the period. There are different 
types of commitment structures in any period. In modern society, imposed evaluation of 
knowledge by education & mass media is dominant. New type of mutual commitment
13
structure is developing under the Internet & IT mediated world rapidly. 
     For evolving the evaluation landscape of underlying activities dynamically , we have 
to learn the knowledge about the situation. Knowledge creates our evaluation landscape, 
which dominates our supporting attitude. 
In modern society, knowledge are supported by rather centralized systems. In post modem 
society it will be supported by some IT mediated social networks. Knowledge is created , 
shared and evaluated on the social networks. The networks compete with each other. 
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Figure 17 Meta Commitment by Knowledge & Information with Network Reputation 
6. Conclusion 
     We formalized Axcelrod's norm and meta norm games with weak coupled replicator 
dynamics. In this approach, we assume that RD represents ocial learning processes. It is 
different from evolutionary interpretation of RD. To justify this assumption, we derived RD 
from stochastic processes of social learning. 
     By using the social learning dynamics we have analyzed mutual and hierarchal 
commitment processes among agents. In usual rational decision making theory, we do not 
mention about these types of social learning and commitment processes. 
In other words we have introduced two types of extensions of the concept of rationality. 
     The one is learning rationality , which means that social learning processes of agents 
are rational in a certain sense. In our social learning we do not assume perfect nor complete 
information. Agents do not interact such as n person game. An agent decides by himself step 
by step depending on average payoff information of each alternative at the step. Macro social 
learning consists of the step by step dynamics of statistical decisions of agents. 
     The other is commitment rationality which means that agents have mutual and 
hierarchal commitments uch as "norm" or "meta norm". Why are commitments rational in a
14
given situation? This question is a generalization of the one that why norm collapses or dose 
not collapses. 
     Robert Axelrod has introduced the concept of meta norm [3; ch. 3]. But it cause next 
question that why meta norm collapses or dose not collapses. R. Gaylord and D'Andria 
mentioned about his question in their book [8; ch. 5]. Jhon Maynerd Smith also points. out 
that social norm is not always stable in his famous book, which is an origin of RD [9; ch. 13]. 
     Our answer is simple. A commitment is rational if the alternative for the commitment 
is stable in the sense of social learning dynamics under the given social and political 
situations. The rationality of commitment comes from the stability of social learning 
dynamics. 
     We also introduced the higher order centralized and decentralized commitment 
processes that effect as indirect regulation or control mechanism of an agent society. The 
theory of hierarchical commitments for an agent society is a new frontier for agent based 
approaches. We have to develop the theory for designing our post modern society. 
     For developing this area, both of agents based heuristic simulation and theoretical 
analysis are important.
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